The Internet of Things (IoT) is a fast growing field of devices being added to an interconnected environment in an abstract heterogeneous array of servers and devices, called smart environments, ranging from private local environments to nation-wide infrastructures, often accessible via unsecured wireless communications and information technologies, hence, massively open to attacks. In this paper we propose an On-The-Fly One Time Pad (OTP) protocol based upon the Diffie-Hellman key exchange for secure communications between smart devices endowed with low computational capabilities to a home gateway server via unsecured wireless communication channels. Our assumptions are that at setup both a user and the home gateway server have enough processing power to perform -saysecured RSA encrypted communication, hence relaxing the need for a trusted secure server outside the domain, and that the protocol should at least be secure for a range of known attacks, as replay or DoS attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In an ubiquitous world, potential and actual security breaches into otherwise secure systems are continuously being produced, as a consequence of an ever increasing number of devices with weak security standards, as often is the case in the IoT paradigm. Hence, the need for addressing the balance between resources with low computational capabilities, user friendliness and security, in terms of confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and authentication of applications via suitable encryption protocols.
Indeed, as remarked by Thomas Reid in his Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, 1786, "In every chain of reasoning, the evidence of the last conclusion can be no greater than that of the weakest link of the chain...", conveniently rephrased as "A chain is only as strong as its weakest link". It turns out that the user is -more often than not -the weakest link in the interplay between humans and computers, a subject that is referred to as Human-Computer Interaction and Security (HCISec) [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] and has attracted much attention in the last few years.
There are plenty of reports on security breaches that illustrate the importance of secure authentication and secure session keys even for the simplest smart devices and local home networks 1 . Typically, a normal user will almost always accept the default security settings in an IoT device making this link the weakest one, precisely because of the known limited processing power inherent to most smart devices available nowadays and the fact that default security settings means often no security at all.
Approaches for dealing with this kind of weakness frequently involve the assumption of an external trusted server with which secure sessions can be established. Yet, it is precisely inside the domains of the home environment that attackers can successfully gain access to otherwise secure facilities, via impersonation or other types of malicious attacks.
Following [5] and [6] , the connection of an IoT device to a home gateway using wireless networks requires suitable authentication protocols and encryption, in order to avoid the well known Man in the Middle (MITM), which is assumed to be a Dolev-Yao type of attacker, i.e., a malicious third party having partial or complete access to the wireless communications between devices and the server [7] .
For the system setup, we propose establishing a secure connection between a given smart device (SD) and a home server, through the home gateway (router) (we will continue referring to this home server and home gateway pair as HG) without referring to an external secure trusted server. Our protocol uses instead the End User as a One Time Trusted Server (OTTS) (which is used only once at configuration time) for securely creating a Diffie-Hellman (DH) One Time Pad (OTP) for on-the-fly encryption between the device and the home server. Once the setup protocol has been executed, all communications between the selected device and the server run XOR-encrypted and can be hence considered secure.
A potential drawback of this procedure could lie in an eventual loss, interruption or tampering of communications, which would require again user interaction for restarting the protocol, an issue which we address in section IV.
This article proceeds as follows: We base our considerations mostly upon [5] and the references cited therein. Section II provides a brief description of the basics of Diffie-Hellman key exchange and RSA authentication. Both RSA and DH require previous agreement between parties (Alice and Bob) upon the modular arithmetic to be used, which normally happens without concern about secrecy of those said parameters. If both parties have enough computational power so as to possess, each, valid RSA public and private keys, both algorithms can be combined to securely agree upon key generation parameters for the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, which, nonetheless, still 978-1-7281-5613-2/19/$31.00 2019 © IEEE doesn't avoid an active adversary to assume the role of one of the parties. Section III presents our protocol which takes care of this possibility by adding a third party at setup time, the User, with which the assumption of secure connection to a trusted external server can thus be relaxed. Section IV deals with the issue of restarting the protocol. We close the article with some comments upon the security analysis of the proposed protocol as well as a discussion of its applicability to high and low throughput smart devices.
II. BACKGROUND

A. Diffie-Hellmann Key Exchange
The well-known Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange [8] protocol proceeds as follows:
• Alice and Bob share knowledge of two primes g and p,
in which g is a primitive root 2 of p. • Alice generates or has a secret a ∈ {2, . . . p − 2} [9] . • Alice computes the quantity x = g a mod p and sends x to Bob (over the insecure channel). • Bob knows (g, p) and chooses his own secret b for computing y = g b mod p, which is then sent over to Alice. • Both Alice and Bob now compute y a mod p and x b mod p respectively. • The computed result K = y a mod p = x b mod p is identical for both, Alice and Bob, while all the transmitted data is indistinguishable from random, hence the insecure channel causes no trouble. K can now be used for OTP XOR-encrypting exchanges between Alice and Bob.
B. RSA Signature
We consider now the standard RSA signature [9] as follows: If Bob needs to ensure that it was Alice who sent him some information Z, they proceed as follows:
• Alice and Bob have each their own private and public Key, which we denote by K A pub , K A priv for Alice, and K B pub , K B priv for Bob. • Alice sends to Bob the signed pair (Z, E K A priv (Z)). • Bob decrypts the second part of Alice's message using her public Key and checks whether Z = D K A pub (E K A priv (Z)) or not. If equality is achieved, the message is recognized as having been duly signed by Alice, whereas if it is not, then the message was either corrupted or intercepted and tampered with.
C. Certified agreement upon G p
Assume now that the structural data for establishing RSA authentication and DH should be agreed upon by preserving privacy between parties Alice and Bob. A standard signature procedure allows for this:
• Assume Alice and Bob have each their own RSA public and private keys.
• Alice choose two primes g and p with g a primitive root of G p , which will be her secret. • She encrypts the pair (g, p) with her own private Key K A priv : E K A priv (g, p). • She encrypts now the signed message M = (g, p, E K A priv (g, p)) with Bob's public key: E B pub (M) and sends it to Bob, which decodes it, check the signature using Alice's public key and -since the check will succeed -obtains as a result a valid shared (g, p) with which now a valid DH-Key Exchange can be safely performed between Alice and Bob. Notice that the RSA authentication as described above is one-sided, in the following sense: The structural space G p is proposed by Alice and she keeps it secret. After completion of the protocol, Bob thinks he knows for sure that Alice shared her secret Z with him. But a careful analysis shows that if Alice has been hacked, then a malicious Man-in-the-Middle (MITM), which we call Daniel (Dan), may have intercepted Alice's message and replaced it with his own signed triple (Z, E K D priv (Z)) after replacing Alice's public key with his own K D pub . So now Bob will address Dan each time he thinks he is talking to Alice. This is a standard issue in two-party authentication and is the reason why a handshaking protocol between Alice and Bob has to happen as in the Station-to-Station (STS) protocol, see [10] , but also explains variants of the kind authenticated key agreement with key confirmation (AKC) [11] , [8] , [12] .
III. PROTOCOL In the following we use the notation for encryption, decryption and concatenation as shown in Table I:   TABLE I  SYMBOLS AND DESCRIPTIONS   Symbols Description
Encryption: Message m is encrypted using key K, producing the ciphertext c.
Decryption: Message m is decrypted into plain text using key K from the ciphertext c.
||
String concatenation operator
By introducing the End User as a third party with enough (offline) processing power, we can relax the assumption made upon Alice and establish a secure connection as follows:
Consider our given IoT device (like a temperature sensor, a door actuator or similar) which we denote by SD, a smart device with low or limited computational capability. We will assign to it the role of Alice and shall assume that it is powerful enough as to autonomously produce (pseudo) random numbers and perform exponentiation in modular arithmetic. Alice will be connected via an open unsecured channel (a wireless connection, for example) to a home gateway (HG), which will be our Bob, which we assume is a server (or computer) with enough computational power as to be able to have its own public and private key for RSA purposes.
A. System Architecture
The environment in which we assume this protocol to proceed is shown in Figure 1 . This is a typical Smart Home Environment with many different types of low power devices, all communicating with a central Home Server that can then process or relay all of the information produced by these Smart Devices. Most of these devices are thought to have a low frequency of communication.
At any point, the home owner or User could access, for example, a web interface and look at the status of all of these devices.
B. System Setup
The user performing the setup, which we call U, proceeds to connect the SD (Alice) to the HG (Bob) as in [13] , using for example a HAN protocol like ZigBee, known as SD-To-HG communication pattern.
Assuming RSA asymmetric key cryptography is available for the user U and the home gateway HG, as well as an offline interface for the User enabling him to physically write into the SD's firmware as many parameters as needed, our system setup protocol proceeds as follows:
• U generates a one-time (configuration session) RSA pair K SD pub , K SD priv intended for Alice, as well as a pair (g, p) with p a prime number and g a primitive root which defines the structural space G p . • U writes into the SD (Alice) the private key K SD priv . • U sends to Bob (the gateway HG) the RSA encrypted message E K HG pub ((g, p)||K SD pub ). Notice that, strictly speaking, U should send the signed message encrypted with HG's public key (g, p) ), and sends it over (the still insecure channel) to Alice.
• Alice requests Bob's public key and checks for message integrity (authentication) by verifying that D K HG pub (E K HG priv (g, p)) = (g, p).
Step Home Gateway (HG) OTTS (User) Smart Device (SD) Encrypts
Fig. 2. System Setup for On-The-Fly DH
As a result, Alice and Bob now share knowledge of (g, p), provided securely by U and can hence Diffie-Hellman ad libitum between them, which they will use for jointly creating the Key for the OTP.
Observe that we deviate from the system design used in [5] in that we do not assume the existence of an external (secure) trusted Service Provider (SP). In our setting, generation and assignment of keys for securely handshaking between Alice and Bob is entrusted to the end user (U) by means of a onetime RSA authentication, using U and the SD on one side, and assuming secure communications between the HG and the User on the other. Also, requirements upon the SD are only in terms of performing basic modular arithmetic needed just for Diffie-Hellman.
C. On-the-fly OTP
Once Alice and Bob have securely identified themselves at system setup via the above procedure, and shared the (now secret) values of (g, p), they proceed to encrypt their communication via XOR-ing on the fly: Each time a packet of length σ will be transmitted a DH procedure is performed in order to generate a new key with which the packet is XOR encoded. Hence the name 'on-the-fly'. We point out that the overhead of calculating new Diffie-Hellman parameters for every message can be afforded since communication occurs in sufficiently separated bursts.
Via suitable padding and delay agreement, the protocol can be adapted to include the new (encoded) value of the key for the next data transfer, as well as the use of time stamps as nonces in order to avoid replay attacks, see section V, subsection E. Masquerade or Forgery attack below.
IV. RE-INITIALIZATION
Should communication between Alice (the SD) and Bob (the HG) be interrupted or fail the authentication, rebooting the system is easy if the private key belonging to the SD has not been compromised. It suffices to Bob reestablishing communication by creating a new pair (g, p) and authenticating himself with Alice to share (g, p) to her. Provided -of course -that Bob has not been hacked into. If, on the contrary, K SD priv has been exposed, user U has to manually re-initiate the system by furnishing a new system setup.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we argue about the protocol's security properties (Authentication, message freshness, data integrity, etc) and its resistance to various attacks (Replay attack, Man in the Middle, etc). According to [14] , security in a smart home environment requires "...the maintenance of six essential properties; Confidentiality, Integrity, Authentication, Authorization, Non-repudiation and Availability". We follow closely the arguments proposed for the security analysis in [5] , while a detailed analysis using common attacker models, such as Dolev-Yao adversaries [7] , [15] , or assessing the security of our protocol formally via Proverif 3 [16] , Tamarin 4 [17] or Cryptoverif 5 [18] is being presently undertaken and will be presented in a forthcoming article.
A. Authentication
At the beginning of the protocol (System Setup), as described by Section III-A, the User must have physical access to the SD device he is setting up, therefore, authentication between SD and U can be assumed as granted de facto. On the other hand, authentication between U and HG proceeds through the RSA private and public key process, so that this part of the communication channel can be assumed secure: Any eavesdropper watching the traffic between U and HG will see, for example the data ((g, p)||K SD pub ) encrypted with HG's public key K HG pub , so that only HG can decode it with his own private key K HG priv . Similarly, once the user U has written the private key K SD priv for SD onto the device, communication between SD and HG can be assumed authenticated via the same procedure as above.
B. Key Establishment
After authenticating each other, parties in the protocol will establish a DH-shared key each time a message has to be transmitted, which is then used to XOR-encrypt the said message, which is why we call it an on-the-fly OTP instead of a session key. In order for this to happen while preserving security, the size of the message should not exceed the size of the shared key, which is why, in principle, our approach would not be sufficient for, say, continuous data streaming as in video devices. Nonetheless, buffering via latency of the computations depending on technology could be brought in for inserting reestablishment of the DH-key session at fixed intervals, an issue which we do not pursue here and will be the subject of a forthcoming article.
Besides, as long as the structure data (g, p) remains known only to the legitimate parties, communication between them via XOR-encrypted messages require only the generation of new private DH parameters for each message sent. This precludes a malicious party from gaining access to the next messages based upon knowledge of the previous ones, unless, of course, the SD device and its firmware can be completely simulated, together with the software being used to generate the keys.
A procedure for dealing with this possibility can be easily derived along the lines of [5] , section IV, authentication and key establishment.
C. Secrecy
Before sending a message, the sending party (SD or HG) encrypts it using the shared key that must be at least of the same length as the message in order to use it as a OTP to generate the ciphertext. By using the DH procedure, the parameters performing the DH-OTP will look random to any observer, which will be unable to determine the key, thus the transmitted XOR'd result will appear to be random to any eavesdropper or malicious party.
D. Freshness
This scheme generates a new (seemingly random) key every time a message should be sent. Even if the message is replayed, the ciphered text will not be recognized by the receiving party because of the different key they agreed upon before sending it. Hence replay attacks are naturally avoided with this procedure diminishing also the workload implicit in handshaking protocols.
E. Masquerade or Forgery attack
If a malicious attacker wanted to masquerade himself as the HG in order to read the sensitive data he would necessarily need to obtain first the private key K HG priv . Our protocol does certainly not prevent this from happening.
On the other hand, in order for an attacker to forge a valid message and send it to HG (in order to confuse or obfuscate the system by presenting intentionally wrong data, for example), the attacker should gain access to the structural data (g, p), known in encrypted form by SD and HG only, in order to successfully simulate an authenticated SD message. For this, the intruder would need to physically gain access to the SD in the home network and thus extract this sensitive information, unless proper hardware security, (for example encrypting the device's flash memory) is applied, a resource that would have side effects in performance.
We do not address this issue here, but instead point out that it has been addressed elsewhere, see for example [19] (firmware attack) and the references therein.
VI. CONCLUSION
Smart home environments are an essential part of the Internet of Things, in which devices with low computational capabilities or power are connected to a communications network, accessible from 'the outside' through a Gateway HG, in most of cases, these systems are completely unsecured schemes or with unmodified or built-in or factory-default security parameters.
Security professionals should be aware of the fact that while they need to give the utmost precedence to system security, they cannot overlook user experience. They must ascertain that, only authorized users have access to the system, and also make sure that users feel safe, with the knowledge that their information is safe online and they can continue to safely use it.
In this paper, we follow closely the protocol presented in [5] and [6] for Smart-Home-Environments but change some assumptions in both, the environment and the protocol itself, most notably in that the need for a trusted server outside the home network is no longer required. Instead, we replace the Trusted Server furnishing Keys and security by the (home) End User at system setup or configuration time, hence shifting the paradigm from a session-oriented protocol to a user initiated on-the-fly one.
Furthermore, by changing the assumptions upon the network architecture, we restrict ourselves strictly to the locality of the environment uncoupled or detached from any external communication services. For this to succeed, we require a central device in the smart home environment with whom the user communicates, independently of the outside connections, that acts as Home Gateway. Equivalently, we require a HG with computational capabilities powerful enough as to provide full RSA encryption between the user and the HG.
This type of proposals give responsibility to the end-users and open up a line of future research: How can we avoid a bad user experience in these IoT devices when we require technical information? Can we simplify the information required without affecting security aspects?
For the time being, we do believe that our proposed on-thefly protocol is a feasible option, at least for devices with very low bandwidth and low frequency of communications, granting privacy, authentication and security as described above, but also that via careful packet padding and/or buffering, the on-the-fly technique can also be applied for data streaming devices also.
How this performs and is actually implemented, together with an analysis of attacker models, as in [15] is a subject whose discussion will be pursued in another work, with emphasis in performance.
